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This paper analyzes a game theoretic model of groundwater extraction in an asymmetric two-
cell aquifer under incomplete information about the extent to which the local stock of 
groundwater depends on the extraction histories at nearby wells.  A novel assumption is that 
the elevation of the bottom of the aquifer differs across, otherwise identical, cells. Asymmetry 
creates a strategic advantage (disadvantage) for the user in the deep (shallow) cell in 
“stealing” neighbor’s water.  The user with a larger initial stock actually benefits from the 
commonality of groundwater provided that the asymmetry is not too small or too great.  
Assuming that the asymmetry between users is sufficiently large, better informed, non-
cooperative users attain a higher joint welfare when the prior belief about the rate of 
transmission is sufficiently dispersed.  Moreover, better hydrologic information may allow 
non-cooperative users to achieve maximum social welfare even in the absence of 
groundwater use regulations.  Yet, in an asymmetric aquifer there may be both winners and 
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  2Groundwater Use in Asymmetric Aquifer under Incomplete Information 
1. Introduction 
Groundwater use has traditionally been analyzed under the assumptions of complete 
information about the hydrologic properties of an aquifer.  This assumption is rarely 
questioned since most models of exploitation of groundwater as a common property resource 
rely on a rather stylized representation of groundwater hydrology.  As is exemplified in 
Gisser and Sanchez (1980), it has become standard to (a) assume that the changes in the 
groundwater level are transmitted instantaneously to all users, and (b) describe an aquifer as a 
“bathtub”, i.e. a basin with parallel sides and a flat bottom.  Under these assumptions, the 
location of users in the area overlying the aquifer where the groundwater is mined is 
immaterial, and a representative user exists.  However, the lateral movement of groundwater 
is, typically, not instantaneous and may be quite slow depending on the geologic conditions, 
and water level (the saturated thickness) varies across wells and users.
1,2
  We continue the line of inquiry initiated in Saak and Peterson (2007) (henceforth, SP) 
who relaxed assumption (a) that the rate of transmission is instantaneous, and studied 
groundwater use under incomplete information about its magnitude.
3  As SP pointed out, due 
to the complexity of natural hydrologic systems and the geologic variability, users are likely 
to have incomplete knowledge of the velocity of lateral flows in the aquifer.  Typically, each 
user is aware that his neighbor’s water use has some influence on his future water stock, but 
may be uncertain about the degree of this impact.  SP analyzed a simple two-period, restricted 
access setting with a symmetric two-cell aquifer, and found that the lack of information in an 
unregulated (non-cooperative) equilibrium may either increase or decrease the average rate of 
water use and welfare depending on the curvature of the intertemporal marginal rate of 
substitution for water.
4    
                                                 
1Groundwater flows much faster in gravels and sands than in clay or in rock fractures.  For example, typical 
groundwater velocity in a sandy or gravelly aquifer may range from 0.5 to 50 feet per day (Harter 2003). 
2 For example, in the High Plains aquifer the water-level changes from the time prior to substantial groundwater 
irrigation development (circa 1950) to 2005 range between a rise of 84 feet and a decline of 277 feet (McGuire 
2007). 
3 A brief review of the previous literature on groundwater exploitation as a common property resource can be 
found in SP.  Negri (1989), Dixon (1989), and Provencher and Burt (1993) developed dynamic game-theoretic 
models of groundwater use in a restricted access setting.  Brozovic (2003) studied the social efficient allocation 
in a “non-bathtub” aquifer with spatially disbursed users and finite transmissivity.   
4 There is a large literature on the effects of information on equilibrium outcomes (e.g. Boyer and Kirhlstrom 
1984).  While more information enables decision-makers to better tailor their actions to circumstances, it may 
  3This paper departs from the existing literature by relaxing both assumptions (a) and 
(b).  Generalizing SP’s setting, we analyze a model of groundwater use in an asymmetric 
two-cell aquifer (“shallow-cell-deep-cell”), where the elevation of the bottom (bedrock) 
differs across, otherwise identical, cells.  The focus of this paper is on four questions: (1) 
whether in an asymmetric aquifer all users are made worse off by the exploitation of 
groundwater as a common property resource, (2) how better public information about the 
speed of lateral flows affects the average rates of pumping of individual users, (3) when better 
information raises overall welfare, and (4) whether better information makes some users 
better off and others worse off.   
Following the SP’s approach, we characterize non-cooperative equilibrium outcomes 
in complete and incomplete information regimes, and then compare ex ante welfare of 
individual users in each regime.  The asymmetry in the initial stocks of groundwater 
(saturated thickness), combined with the possibility of lateral flows, introduces non-concavity 
into the profit function of the user in the shallow cell.  It is a novel feature that cannot arise in 
a symmetric aquifer under the standard assumptions about the technology.  Notably, in an 
asymmetric aquifer, the commonality of groundwater may be a source of not only 
intertemporal but also distributional inefficiencies.  The user in the cell with a larger initial 
stock has a strategic advantage in appropriating her (smaller) neighbor’s stock, and in fact, 
benefits (at the expense of her neighbor) from the lack of “full” ownership rights to 
groundwater as long as the extent of asymmetry is not too small or too great.
5
We find that the asymmetry among users is an important determinant of the effect of 
public information on the equilibrium outcomes and profits of individual users.  Consider an 
                                                                                                                                                        
also constrain the set of feasible choices (Eckwert and Zilcha 2000).  For example, Hirschleifer (1971) 
demonstrated that in an exchange economy the value of information may be negative because better information 
decreases the scope of ex ante risk-sharing opportunities among the agents.  Our line of inquiry is also related to 
the literature on experimentation and learning in the multi-agent setting.  For example, Harrington (1995) 
investigates a duopoly in which firms are uncertain about the degree of product differentiation but can learn 
from experimentation with prices.  He finds that firms’ incentive to acquire more information about the extent of 
product differentiation (i.e. a potential externality imposed by the firms on each other) depends on their prior 
beliefs.  Although in our setting users do not experiment to learn more about the extent to which the resource is 
shared (since information has no value in the second period), the externality is dynamic and the willingness to 
pay for public information (and hence, an incentive to experiment) differs across agents.   
5 While groundwater users typically need to own or rent the overlying land as well as a water right, neighboring 
users usually do not compensate each other for the gain/loss of one’s water stock stemming from lateral 
groundwater movements (Kaiser and Skiller 2001).  Due to space constraints, a characterization of the socially 
efficient allocation as well as an examination of how the gains from optimal groundwater management are 
distributed across users under different information regimes are not reported here.  It can be shown that the 
“tragedy of the commons effect” may be reduced or enhanced by the asymmetry among users. 
  4aquifer with (i) a sufficiently large variation in the initial stocks (bottom elevation) across 
cells, and (ii) a sufficiently diffuse prior probability distribution of the transmissivity 
parameter.  Our main result is that in such an aquifer non-cooperative users achieve a higher 
expected joint welfare under better public information for any concave production 
technology.  But this gain is not equally distributed among users. In fact, while the user in the 
shallow cell is made better off, the user in the deep cell is made worse off by better public 
information. 
Our model can be adapted to study the exploitation of other common property 
resources (such as fish, wildlife, or oil) by spatially distributed and heterogeneous users who 
are uncertain about the degree to which the resource is non-exclusive.  For example, in 
fisheries exclusivity is determined by the rates of biomass dispersal across space, while 
asymmetry among users may arise due to the initial distribution of the stock and the 
asymmetric density-dependent migration (Sanchirico and Wilen 2005).  In such settings, 
public information about the properties of the resource and environment may either enhance 
or reduce the overall welfare when the use of the resource is not regulated.  Perhaps more 
importantly, it may hurt some users but benefit others if asymmetry among them is 
significant.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  In Section 2, we extend the SP’s model 
to the case of an asymmetric aquifer.  In Section 3, we characterize equilibrium under 
incomplete information about the lateral flow velocity, of which equilibrium under complete 
information is a special case.  In Section 4, we compare the equilibrium pumping rates and 
expected profits of individual users in the two information regimes.  In Section 5, we offer 
some concluding remarks and policy implications. 
   
2. Model 
We follow SP’s notation.  There are two periods,  2 , 1 = t , and two identical users (farmers), 
.  The model of the “shallow-cell-deep-cell” aquifer is depicted in Figure 1.  In the 
beginning of period 1, the stocks of groundwater on farm i is  , 
2 , 1 = i
1 , i x 2 , 1 = i , where  1 , 2 1 , 1 x x ≤ .
6  
                                                 
6
i i ASd x = 1 , , where   is cell land area times storativity (which is homogeneous throughout the aquifer), and 
 is the average vertical distance from the water table to the base of the saturated zone (the saturated thickness) 
in cell i,  .  For example, in the parts of the High Plains aquifer the estimated predevelopment (between 
AS
i d
2 1 d d ≤
  5We normalize the average initial stock of groundwater to unity, so that  , and 
, where   is the extent of asymmetry between the initial stocks.  And so, 
SP’s model is a special case of the present setting with 
s x − =1 1 , 1
s x + =1 1 , 2 ) 1 , 0 [ ∈ s
0 = s .  In what follows, the first 
symbol, i, in double subscripts on variables identifies the farm and the second, t, identifies the 
period; single subscripts of functions denote first derivatives.  Let   denote the amount of 
groundwater pumped on farm   in period   (in the case of mixed strategies, the notation is 
easily adapted).  The amount that can be used for irrigation on each farm cannot exceed that 
farm’s groundwater stock: 
t i u ,
i t
(1)   for   and  .    t i t i x u , , ≤ 2 , 1 = t 2 , 1 = i
According to condition (1), the individual groundwater stock is a private resource during each 
irrigation season, i.e. there is no intra-seasonal well interference, a reasonable assumption for 
most aquifers and typical spatial separation of wells.
7
   
pump  pump 






Figure 1.  Hydrology of groundwater in a “shallow-cell-deep-cell” aquifer 
   
2.1. Lateral groundwater flows 
Between periods 1 and 2, groundwater will flow toward the well with the greater extraction in 
period 1. In particular, the inter-period flow of groundwater from farm 1 to farm 2 is given by 
                                                                                                                                                        
1940 and 1950) saturated thickness varied from less than 50 to over 300 feet (Schloss et al 2000).  The initial 
spatial distribution of groundwater resources is determined by bedrock elevation along with land surface 
elevation (topography) and patterns of recharge and discharge.  
7 SP justify condition (1) by observing that, typically, groundwater flows too slowly for the extractions to 
interact during an irrigation season.  Because the length of irrigation seasons is typically short, the “cones of 
depression” in the groundwater surface created by pumping at neighboring wells are not likely to intersect.  
Most lateral flows occur during a longer period of time that elapses between irrigation seasons.  The extent to 
which the groundwater is an inter-seasonal common property depends on the velocity of lateral flows across 
farms.  
  6Darcy’s law: 
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where α ] 5 . 0 , 0 [ ∈  summarizes the hydrologic properties of the region,   is the 
hydraulic gradient (the difference in hydraulic head between wells) in the end of period 1.
1 , 1 1 , 2 u u −
8  
The flow of groundwater from farm 2 to farm 1 is  Q − .  The flow of groundwater between 
farms is bounded by the stocks left in each cell in the end of the irrigation season, ) ( - 1 , 2 1 , 2 u x −  
.  Because cell 1 is more shallow,  1 , 1 1 , 1 u x Q − ≤ ≤ ) 1 , 0 [ ∈ s , and the amount that can be used 
for irrigation on each farm in each period cannot exceed that farm’s groundwater stock (see 
(1)), it must be that  1 , 2 1 , 2 1 , 2 1 , 1 ) ( u x u u − ≤ − α , so that 
  )] ( , min[ ) , ( 1 , 1 1 , 2 1 , 1 1 , 1 1 , 2 1 , 1 u u u x u u Q − − = α . 
The stocks of groundwater available in period 2 are
9
(2)  ] 0 , ) 1 ( max[ ) , , ( 1 , 2 1 , 1 1 , 1 1 , 1 1 , 1 1 , 2 1 , 1 2 , 1 u u x Q u x u u x α α α − − − = − − = , and   
] , ) 1 ( min[ ) , , ( 1 , 1 1 , 1 1 , 2 1 , 2 1 , 1 1 , 2 1 , 2 1 , 2 1 , 2 1 , 2 1 , 1 2 , 2 u x u x u u x Q u x u u x − + − − − − = + − = α α α . 
While groundwater is always an intra-seasonally private property resource,  5 . 0 = α  
corresponds to the inter-seasonally common property resource because it implies that 
groundwater levels are equalized across farms in  2 = t ,  2 , 2 2 , 1 x x = , for any pumping in  1 = t , 
provided that  , while  ) ( 5 . 0 1 , 2 1 , 1 1 , 1 u u x + > 0 = α  corresponds to the purely private resource. 
   
2.2 Benefits of groundwater use 
The net benefits of water use on each farm is given by  
(3)  ,  () (,) () (,) =− gux v p yu cux k −
where  p  is the per unit price of the crop,  y  is yield, c is the cost of pumping groundwater, 
 is the cost of other farming inputs, and v is a utility-of-income function. An empirically  k
                                                 
8 L kZ / = α , where k is hydraulic conductivity, Z is the cross-sectional area of flow, L is the distance between 
wells on each farm (Freeze and Cherry 1979).  We treat α  and s as independent parameters.  This can be 
justified by, for example, the distribution of the bedrock elevation within and across cells. 
9 For simplicity, we assume no aquifer recharge, although recharge could easily be incorporated in the analysis 
and would not change the qualitative nature of our results. 
  7estimated specification of (3) is provided in Peterson and Ding (2005).  Throughout, we 
assume that g is twice differentiable, strictly increasing, concave, and supermodular (i.e. 
) over the relevant domain,  0 ≥ ux g (0, ) 0 g ⋅ = , (0, ) u g ⋅ =∞, and  . 0 ) , ( lim = ∞ → x u gu u
10   
   
2.3 Information about the hydrology of the region 
Following SP, we distinguish between two information regimes.  Under complete 
information, in period 1 farmers know with certainty the “speed” of lateral groundwater flow, 
α .  Under incomplete information, in period 1 farmers view α ~ as a random variable and 
only know its probability distribution,  ) ( ) ~ Pr( α α α H = ≤ , where H represents the variation in 
geologic conditions throughout the aquifer.
11  In the latter case, information is assumed to be 
symmetric across farmers, so that their subjective probabilities, H, are identical.  
Farmers maximize the sum of discounted per period profits: 
(4)  )) , , ( , ( ) , ( 1 , 2 1 , 1 2 , 2 , 1 , 1 , u u x u g x u g i i i i α β +  subject to (1) and (2), 
where β  is the discount factor, and  2 , 1 = i .  Let   and   denote the maximum 






2 , 1 = i , respectively under 
complete and incomplete information about the hydrology of the region.  Here superscripts 
“c” and “n” stand for, respectively, “complete” and “no information”. 
   
3. Equilibrium 
We proceed by first characterizing equilibrium allocation under incomplete information.  The 
equilibrium under complete information is then obtained as a special case of the incomplete 
information regime.  
   
3.1. Incomplete information 
In this section, we determine equilibrium pumping by both farmers when they know the 
probability distribution of the lateral flow speed but not the local realization of  ] 5 . 0 , 0 [ ~∈ α .  
For simplicity, we assume that α ~ has a two-point probability distribution with  ) ~ Pr( L α α =  
                                                 
10 The assumption that   is strictly increasing in u for all   ) , ( x u g ] , 0 [ x u∈  reflects a situation of absolute water 
scarcity; all of the water remaining in period 2 will be consumed. If water is not scarce in this sense, so that 
 is decreasing in   for  , the analysis needs some modifications (e.g., a longer time horizon).  ) , ( x u g u ] , ˆ [ x u u∈
11 There is a large variation in local hydrologic properties such as the aquifer’s storativity and transmissivity 
values as well as well-spacing requirements that vary from 4 miles in parts of Kansas to less than 300 feet in 
Texas (Brozovic 2003, Kaiser and Skiller 2001).   For example, the hydraulic conductivity typically ranges from 
100 to 10,000 gallons per day (gpd) per square foot in sandy or gravelly aquifers (Harter 2003). 
  8q = ,  q H − = = 1 ) ~ Pr( α α ,  , and  ) 1 , 0 ( ∈ q 5 . 0 0 ≤ < ≤ H L α α .
12   
In period 2, both farmers optimally exhaust the available stocks of underground water 
because g is increasing—i.e.,  2 , 2 , i
n
i x u = ) , , ~ ( 1 , 2 1 , 1
n n u u α  for  2 , 1 = i .  Farmer i’s net benefits in t=2 
depend on decisions made in t=1 by virtue of the binding (hydrologic) constraint (2), and as 
usual, we solve the game backwards.  In t=1, farmer i chooses   to maximize 
n
i u 1 ,
(5)  ))] , , ~ ( ( [ ) , ( max 1 , 2 1 , 1 2 , 1 , 1 ,
1 ,
n n
i i i u
n
i u u x b E x u g n
i α β π + =  subject to (1) and (2), 
where   is the periodic profit for a farmer who consumes his entire stock  ) , ( ) ( x x g x b = x.  
The cell asymmetry reveals itself in the pumping decision calculus of farmer 1 and 2.  Farmer 
1’s optimal response to a higher pumping rate by his neighbor is, in general, non-monotone 
(with discontinuous jumps).  However, farmer 2’s optimal response to a higher pumping rate 
by her neighbor is invariably to lower her own pumping rate.   
 
Best response by farmer 1 
Next we characterize the best response by farmer 1 when his neighbor pumps  .  Let  1 , 2 u
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x
u u u x b E x u g
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/   if   , 0
;   if   )}, ~ Pr( ] ~ | ) ~ ) ~ 1 ( ( [ ) , ( {    max
1 , 1 1 , 2
1 , 1
1 , 2 1 , 2 1 , 1 1 , 1
1 , 1   
denote the maximum expected profits achieved by farmer 1 when cell 1 has water in  2 = t  for 
K α α ≤ ~ ,  .  Here the superscripts “H” and “L” stand for “high” and “low” speed of 
lateral flow.
L H K , =
13  Let   for  ) ( 1 , 2 1 , 1 u u
nK
K x u α / 1 , 1 1 , 2 ≤ ,  L H K , = , denote the maximizer of (6), 
which is the (unique) solution to the FOC: 
(7)   0 ) ~ Pr( ] ~ | ) ~ ) ~ 1 ( ( ) ~ 1 [( ) , ( 1 , 2 1 , 1 1 , 1 1 , 1 1 , 1 ≥ ≤ ≤ − − − ′ − − K K
nK nK
u u u x b E x u g α α α α α α α β , (=0 if  ).  1 , 1 1 , 1 x u
nK <
                                                 
12 A generalization where α ~ has a finite support,  5 . 0 ... 0 1 ≤ < < ≤ n α α  and  0 ) ~ Pr( > = i α α  for  , is 
straightforward, but will complicate the notation.   
n i ,... 1 =
13 If in t=2 the stock in cell 1 is positive when the speed is high,  H α α = ~ , it must also be positive when the 
lateral flow is slower,  L α α = ~ , i.e.  0 ) 1 ( 1 , 2 1 , 1 1 , 1 ≥ − − − u u x H H α α  implies that   
since   and  .  Superscript “H” symbolizes that even when the lateral outflow from cell 1 is 
fast, 
0 ) 1 ( 1 , 2 1 , 1 1 , 1 > − − − u u x L L α α
1 , 1 , i i x u ≤ 1 , 2 1 , 1 x x <
H α α = ~ , there is groundwater left in cell 1 in t=2.  Superscript “L” symbolizes that only when the lateral 
flow is slow,  L α α = ~ , there is groundwater left in cell 1 in t=2, but cell 1 is empty if the outflow is fast,  H α α = ~ . 
  9Differentiating (7) yields  ,  ) 0 , 1 ( / ) ( 1 , 2 1 , 2 1 , 1 − ∈ du u du
nK L H K , = , because   is concave and  g
] 5 . 0 , 0 [ ∈ K α .  Also, let  ) ( 1 , 2 1 u
nD π ])] 0 , max[ ~ ( [ ) ( 1 , 2 1 , 1 1 , 1 u x b E x b − + = α β  denote the profits 
achieved by farmer 1 when he consumes his entire stock in period 1.  Here superscript “D” 
stands for “dry well”.   
In addition, we define the following three threshold levels of pumping by farmer 2 
that leave farmer 1 indifferent between pumping  ,  , or  .  Let   be 
(uniquely) determined by the equation 
) ( 1 , 2 1 , 1 u u
nH ) ( 1 , 2 1 , 1 u u
nL
1 , 1 x
nKM u 1 , 2 ˆ
(8)   for  ) ˆ ( ) ˆ ( 1 , 2 1 1 , 2 1
nKM nM nKM nK u u π π = L H K , = ,  D L M , = ,  M K ≠ . 
   
Lemma 1. (Best response by farmer 1)  Under incomplete information, the best response by 
farmer 1 is an upper hemicontinuous correspondence, and it is given by 
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Lemma 1 shows that farmer 1 may increase or decrease his pumping in response to an 
increase in pumping by his neighbor.  To illustrate, suppose that either farmer 2’s pumping 
rate,   is sufficiently small (e.g.  1 , 2 u 1 , 1 1 , 2 x u ≤ ) and/or groundwater never flows laterally too 
fast (i.e.,  H α  is small).  Then the (private) considerations of intertemporal efficiency 
prescribe that farmer 1 save enough of his stock in t=1 to have a positive stock in t=2 even 
when  H α α = ~ .  For a slightly higher neighbor’s pumping, again based on the considerations 
of intertemporal efficiency, farmer 1’s optimal response is to pump less since water becomes, 
on average, more scarce in t=2 due to a greater expected outflow.  On the other hand, as his 
neighbor’s pumping continues to increase, farmer 1 will eventually find it optimal to switch 
to a higher pumping rate, and let his well go dry in t=2 whenever the actual speed of lateral 
flow is high.  If farmer 2’s pumping continues to increase, farmer 1 will eventually find it 
optimal to consume his entire stock in t=1, and let his well go dry in t=2 no matter what the 
actual speed of lateral flow happens to be. 
Note that  ,  , and   depend on the probability distribution of 
nHL u 1 , 2 ˆ
nLD u 1 , 2 ˆ
nHD u 1 , 2 ˆ α ~ and the 
extent of asymmetry in initial stocks,  .  Farmer 1 never depletes his stock in t=1 if  s 0 = L α  
  10and   because, by (8),  .  If there is a strictly positive probability that 
his stock is, in fact, fully private, farmer 1 always saves some groundwater for future use.  On 
the other hand, suppose that 
0 > q ∞ = →
nLD u
L 1 , 2 0 ˆ limα
0 > L α , but   and  q L H α α −  are small.  Then, as his neighbor’s 
pumping increases, farmer 1, who previously pumped   and saved enough stock to 
withstand any outflow, may start pumping   and let his well go dry in t=2 with certainty.   
) ( 1 , 2 1 , 1 u u
nH
1 , 1 x
   
Best response by farmer 2 
Next we consider farmer 2’s best response.   Let  α α α / ) ) 1 ( ( ) , ( 1 , 1 u x u d − − =  for  0 > α , 
denote the minimum pumping by farmer 2 that leaves his neighbor, who pumps u, with no 
groundwater in t=2.  Let   denote the optimal pumping by farmer 2, when farmer 1 
has a positive stock in t=2 for any 
) ( 1 , 1 1 , 2 u u
nH
α ~.  By (5), it is (uniquely) determined by the FOC 
(10)       (=0, if  ).  0 )] ~ ) ~ 1 ( ( ) ~ 1 [( ) , ( 1 , 2 1 , 1 1 , 2 1 , 2 1 , 2 ≥ − − − ′ − +
nH nH
u u u x b E x u g α α α β ] ), , ( min[ 1 , 2 1 , 1 1 , 2 x u d u H α ≤
For  , let   denote the optimal pumping by 
farmer 2 when cell 1 has water in t=2 only if 
1 . 2 1 , 1 ) , ( x u d H ≤ α )] , ( ), , ( [ ) ( 1 , 1 1 , 1 1 , 1 1 , 2 L H
nL u d u d u u α α ∈
L α α = ~ .  By (5), it is (uniquely) determined by 
the FOC  
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Finally, for  , let   denote the optimal pumping by farmer 2 when cell 
1 is always empty in t=2.  By (5), it is (uniquely) determined by the FOC  
1 . 2 1 , 1 ) , ( x u d L ≤ α ) ( 1 , 1 1 , 2 u u
nD
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Differentiation of the FOCs in (10)-(12) establishes that   for 
. The next lemma shows that, provided that the asymmetry is sufficiently large, 
the best responses by farmer 1 and 2 are very different. 
] 0 , 1 ( / ) ( 1 , 1 1 , 1 1 , 2 − ∈ du u du
nK
D L H k , , =
Lemma 2. (Best response by farmer 2)  The best response by farmer 2 is a continuous non-
increasing single-valued function, and it is given by 
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Unlike farmer 1, farmer 2 never pumps more in response to an increase in her neighbor’s 
pumping.  The best response by farmer 2 is a continuous non-increasing function that may 
exhibit flat sections where her pumping remains unchanged for different rates of extraction 
by her neighbor.   
 
3.1.1 Characterization of non-cooperative equilibrium  
First, we establish the existence and a basic property of equilibrium under incomplete 
information. 
 
Lemma 3. (Existence) Under incomplete information, the Nash equilibrium (possibly in 
mixed strategies) exists, and farmer 1 pumps less than farmer 2 in period 1, i.e. 
 (with strict inequality for all 1 ) ~ Pr( 1 , 2 1 , 1 = ≤
n n u u ) 1 , 0 ( ∈ s ), where either   or 
 (or both). 
1 ) 1 ~ Pr( 1 , 1 = − < s u
n
s u
n + <1 1 , 2
   
Also note that in equilibrium farmer 2 earns higher profits than farmer 1, i.e.   since 
asymmetry in bottom elevation bestows a “double” benefit (loss) on farmer 2 (1): a direct 
benefit (loss) due to a larger (smaller) initial stock, and an indirect benefit (loss) due to the 
strategic advantage (disadvantage) in “stealing” water from cell 1 (2) or preserving her (his) 
initial stock for her (his) own use in period 2.   
n n
1 , 2 1 , 1 π π <
Next we show that equilibrium under incomplete information is essentially always 
unique and offer a characterization.  The equilibrium is described by a partitioning of the 
interval of asymmetry levels,  , into at most five sub-intervals.  Within each sub-interval 
farmer 1 saves enough water to prevent the total loss of his stock in t=2 due to an outflow of 
any speed, or just of slow speed, or consumes his entire stock in t=1, or randomizes if his 
optimal response is non-unique. 
) 1 , 0 [
  12Proposition 1. (Uniqueness and characterization) Under incomplete information, equilibrium 
is unique except on a set of parameters of zero measure.  Suppose that   
 for all  .
) , ( ) , ( x u g x u g ux uu +
0 ≤ 1 ≤ ≤ x u
14 There exists  ) , 0 ( 0 H α α ∈  such that for any  ] , 0 [ 0 α α ∈ L , there are at 
most four threshold levels of asymmetry,  , and the equilibrium 
pumping rates are given by 
1 0 ≤ ≤ < ≤ <
nLD nL nHL nH s s s s
-   and  , if  ;  s u u u
n nH n − < = 1 ) ( 1 , 2 1 , 1 1 , 1 ] 1 ), 1 ( 5 . 0 [ ) ( 1 , 1 1 , 2 1 , 2 s s u u u
n nH n + + ∈ = ] , 0 [
nH s s∈
-  , ,  , if  ; 
nHL nHL nH n p u u u = = )) ˆ ( ~ Pr( 1 , 2 1 , 1 1 , 1
nHL nHL nL n p u u u − = = 1 )) ˆ ( ~ Pr( 1 , 2 1 , 1 1 , 1
nHL n u u 1 , 2 1 , 2 ˆ = ) , (
nHL nH s s s∈
-   and  , if  ;  s u u u
n nL n − < = 1 ) ( 1 , 2 1 , 1 1 , 1 ) 1 ), 1 ( 5 . 0 [ ) ( 1 , 1 1 , 2 1 , 2 s s u u u
n nL n + + ∈ = ] , [
nL nHL s s s∈
-  ,   , and  , if  ; 
nLD nLD nL n p u u u = = )) ˆ ( ~ Pr( 1 , 2 1 , 1 1 , 1
nLD n p s u − = − = 1 ) 1 ~ Pr( 1 , 1
nLD n u u 1 , 2 1 , 2 ˆ = ) , (
nLD nL s s s∈
-   and  , if  .  s u
n − =1 1 , 1 ) 1 ( 1 , 2 1 , 2 s u u
nD n − = ] 1 , [
nLD s s∈
 
For  , the strategic advantage of farmer 2 enables her to, at least 
sometimes, “steal” her neighbor’s water, i.e.   
, or forces farmer 1 to consume his entire stock in t=1,  , for 
.  Also, we remark that in equilibrium farmer 2’s pumping rate is the same when 
either (a) groundwater is a fully private resource, i.e. 
) , 0 (
nLD s s∈
1 , 1 1 , 2 1 , 1 2 , 1 1 , 1 )] , ~ , ~ ( ~ [ x u u x u E
n n n < + α < < 1 , 2 x
n u 1 , 2
)] , ~ , ~ ( [ 1 , 2 1 , 1 2 , 2
n n u u x E α + 1 , 1 1 , 1 x u
n =
] 1 , [
nLD s s∈
1 ) 0 ~ Pr( = = α , or (b) the differential in 
bottom elevation is large, i.e.  .  Under either of these two circumstances, 
groundwater becomes a private resource from the point of view of farmer 2, albeit for distinct 
reasons.  While lateral flows could occur in case (b), farmer 2 would incur a prohibitively 
high loss in the intertemporal efficiency of allocation of her own stock if she lowered her 
pumping enough to induce farmer 1 to pump less thus generating an inflow into cell 2. 
nLD s s ≥
Keeping everything else equal, as the extent of asymmetry increases, farmer 1 is more 
likely to take on the risk of letting his well run out of water in t=2 (see Table 1).  For any 
 (respectively,  ,  ,  , or  ), 
farmer 1 saves enough water in t = 1 to guarantee access to groundwater in   for any 
speed of lateral flow 
] , 0 [
nH s s∈ ) , (
nHL nH s s s∈ ] , [
nL nHL s s s∈ ) , (
nLD nL s s s∈ ) 1 , [
nLD s s∈
2 = t
α ~ (respectively, he sometimes (always) takes on the risk of having an 
                                                 
14 That is, in the zero probability events that either  ,  or  , there 
exist multiple probabilities with which farmer 1 randomizes between the profit-maximizing pumping rates in a 
mixed strategy equilibrium. 
1 ˆ 1 , 2 − = = =
nHL nHL nH u s s s 1 ˆ 1 , 2 − = = =
nLD nLD nL u s s s
  13empty cell in   when  2 = t H α α = ~ ,  L α α = ~ ).  As is demonstrated in the following example, 
the equilibrium pumping rates vary with the extent of asymmetry in a non-monotone manner. 
 
Table 1. Water availability in t=2 and asymmetry under incomplete information 
Asymmetry  ] , 0 [
nH s  ) , (
nHL nH s s  ] , [
nL nHL s s  ) , (
nLD nL s s  ] 1 , [
nLD s  
) 0 ) , ~ , ( Pr( 1 , 2 1 , 1 2 , 1 >
n n
L u u x α   1 1  1  nLD p   0 
) 0 ) , ~ , ( Pr( 1 , 2 1 , 1 2 , 1 >
n n
H u u x α   1  nHL p   0 0  0 
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Figure 2. Pumping under incomplete and complete information in asymmetric aquifer 
 
Example 1. (Pumping under incomplete information) Let  u u g = ) ( ,  0 = L α ,  5 . 0 = H α , 
, and  5 . 0 = q 1 = β .  Applying Proposition 1, we find that  ,  , 
,  , and  .  The expected equilibrium pumping rates under 
incomplete information for different levels of asymmetry are shown in Figure 2. 
∞ =
nLD u 1 , 2 ˆ
nHD nHL u u 1 , 2 1 , 2 ˆ ˆ <
38 . 0 =
nH s 5 . 0 =
nHL s 1 = =
nLD nL s s
For  , as the asymmetry increases, farmer 2 capitalizes on her strategic 
advantage of having a larger initial stock, and aggressively raises her pumping rate.  Farmer 1 
] 38 . 0 , 0 [ ∈ s
  14is in the “accommodating mode” in which his consumption in  1 = t  declines with the 
asymmetry from 64% to 36% of his stock as a precaution against possible outflow in case 
H α α = ~ .  However, when the asymmetry reaches the threshold level,  , farmer 1 is 
indifferent between the “accommodating mode” and the “cut-water-loss mode” in which he 
consumes 80% of his stock in  .  As   increases in the interval  , farmer 2’s 
pumping drops from 67% to 52% of her stock, since her gains from a more efficient 
intertemporal allocation begin to dominate the gains from appropriating her neighbor’s water 
(recall that the initial stock in cell 1 is shrinking).  At  , farmer 1 consumes 30%  
(= 80% - 50%) more of his stock than he would were the two cells hydrologically 
disconnected, while the analogous figure for farmer 2 is just 1.6% (= 51.6% - 50%).  For 
, as   increases, farmer 2’s pumping approaches 50% of her initial stock, while 
farmer 1’s pumping remains unchanged at 80%.  Because there is a positive probability that 
groundwater is fully private, i.e. 
38 . 0 =
nHL s
1 = t s ] 5 . 0 , 38 . 0 [
5 . 0 = =
nL s s
) 1 , 5 . 0 [ ∈ s s
0 ) 0 ~ Pr( > = α , neither farmer consumes his or her entire 
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Figure 3.  Profits under incomplete information and when it is known that  0 ~ = α  
Additionally, let us examine how non-cooperative farmers 1 and 2 fare under 
uncertainty about α ~ relative to the situation in which groundwater is a fully private resource 
  15(see Figure 3).  When asymmetry is small,  ] 05 . 0 , 0 [ ∈ s , both farmers suffer from the common 
pool nature of groundwater, i.e. their expected profits are smaller than the profits they would 
achieve were the hydrologic link between cells severed ( 0 ~ = α ).  However, for   
the strategic advantage of farmer 2 allows her to appropriate, on average, enough of farmer 
1’s stock to compensate for inefficiency in the intertemporal allocation of her own stock due 
to uncertain inflow.  Thus only farmer 1 always loses from the lack of “full” ownership rights 
to groundwater. ■ 
) 1 , 05 . 0 [ ∈ s
 
Next we consider the equilibrium under complete information. 
   
3. 2. Complete information 
Equilibrium pumping under complete information about the speed of lateral flow,  ) ~ Pr( α α =  
 for some  1 = ] 5 . 0 , 0 [ ∈ α , can be obtained as a special case of equilibrium characterized 
above by setting  α α = H  and  . 0 = q
15  Then, by Lemma 1,   ,   
, which, by (8), is (uniquely) determined by 
s u
nL − =1 (.) 1 , 1
nHD nHL u u 1 , 2 1 , 2 ˆ ˆ =
) ( ˆ 1 , 2 α
c u ≡
(14)  ,  ) ( ) ˆ ) ˆ ( ) 1 ( ( ) ), ˆ ( ( 1 , 1 1 , 2 1 , 2 1 , 1 1 , 1 1 , 1 1 , 2 1 , 1 x b u u u x b x u u g
c c cN c cN = − − − + α α β
where  , and “N” stands for “not a dry well”.  From (14) 
it follows that   is decreasing in 
) 0 , ; ( ) , ( 1 , 2 1 , 1 1 , 2 1 , 1 = = = q u u u u H
nH cN α α α
c u 1 , 2 ˆ α .  The best response by farmer 1, (9), becomes 
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Turning to farmer 2’s best response, by Lemma 2, we have   when  (.) (.) 1 , 2 1 , 2
nD nL u u =
α α = H  and  , so that under complete information (13) becomes  0 = q
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where   and  .    ) 0 , ; ( ) ; ( 1 , 1 1 , 2 1 , 1 1 , 2 = = = q u u u u H
nD cD α α α ) 0 , ; ( ) ; ( 1 , 1 1 , 2 1 , 1 1 , 2 = = = q u u u u H
nH cN α α α
By Lemma 3, the ordering of the pumping rates in t=1 and profits is preserved under 
complete information, i.e.   and   for  ) ( ) ( 1 , 2 1 , 1 α α
c c u u < ) ( ) ( 2 1 α π α π
c c < ) 1 , 0 ( ∈ s .  The 
                                                 
15 Of course, we can also obtain equilibrium under complete information by setting  1 = q  or 
H L α α = . 
  16characterization of non-cooperative equilibrium under complete information is also obtained 
as a special case of Proposition 1. 
   
Proposition 2. (Pumping under complete information)  Under complete information, 
equilibrium exists and it is unique. Suppose that  0 ) , ( ) , ( ≤ + x u g x u g ux uu  for all  1 ≤ ≤ x u .  
There exist at most two threshold levels of asymmetry,  , such that the 
pumping rates are given by  ,  if  ; 
,  , and   if  ; 
1 ) ( ) ( 0 ≤ ≤ < α α
cD cN s s
) ( 1 , 2 1 , 1 1 , 1
c cN c u u u = ) ( 1 , 1 1 , 2 1 , 2
c cN c u u u = )] ( , 0 [ α
cN s s∈
c c cN c p u u u = = ))) ( ˆ ( ~ Pr( 1 , 2 1 , 1 1 , 1 α
c c p s u − = − = 1 ) 1 ~ Pr( 1 , 1
c c u u 1 , 2 1 , 2 ˆ = )) ( ), ( ( α α
cD cN s s s∈
s u
c − =1 1 , 1 ,   if  , where     ) 1 ( 1 , 2 1 , 2 a u u
cD n − = ] 1 ), ( [ α
cD s s∈ , 1 ˆ : ] 1 , 0 [ inf{ 1 , 2 − ≥ ∈ =
c cN u s s s
) 1 , ˆ ( 1 , 2 s u g
c
u + β ≥ ))]} ˆ ( ˆ ) 1 ( 1 ( ) 1 ( 1 , 2 1 , 1 1 , 2
c cN c u u u s b α α α − − − + ′ − , and    
. 
: ] 1 , 0 [ inf{ ∈ = s s
cD
≥ + ) 1 , ˆ ( 1 , 2 s u g
c
u )} ˆ 1 ( 1 , 2
c u s b − + ′ β
    
The following example illustrates. 
   
Example 2. (Pumping under complete information)  Consider the environment from Example 
1, except now we assume that both farmers know the precise value of α .  First, let  H α α =  
.  Applying Proposition 2, we find that   and  .  
When the extent of asymmetry is small, 
5 . 0 = 14 . 0 1 ˆ ) ( 1 , 2 ≈ − =
c
H
cN u s α 46 . 0 ) ( ≈ H
cD s α
] 07 . 0 , 0 [ ∈ s , the strategic advantage of farmer 2 is 
not a dominant factor, and both farmers save some water in  1 = t ,   
 and    .  
When the extent of asymmetry is greater, 
) ( 1 , 2 1 , 1 1 , 1
c cN c u u u =
3 / ) 2 ) 1 ( 4 ( 1 , 2
c u s − − = ) 5 1 ( 8 . 0 s − = 3 / ) 2 ) 1 ( 4 ( ) ( 1 , 1 1 , 1 1 , 2 1 , 2
c c cN c u s u u u − + = = ) 1 ( 8 . 0 s + =
] 14 . 0 , 07 . 0 [ ∈ s , farmer 2 fully capitalizes on her 
strategic advantage of having a larger initial stock as she consumes all of it in  ,  
, and  .
1 = t
3 / ) 6 2 ( ) ( 1 , 2 1 , 1 1 , 1 s u u u
c cN c − = = s u
c + =1 1 , 2
16  At s=0.14, the total consumption of farmer 2 
                                                 
16 Note that the equilibrium outcome in which farmer 2 consumes her entire stock in t=1, and farmer 1 
effectively saves a portion of his stock for both users, is not specific to this example.  Applying Proposition 2, 
and using the best responses in (15) and (16), it follows that  , and   is 
the unique equilibrium, if   and 
1 , 1 1 , 2 1 1 , 1 ) ( x x u u
cN c < = 1 , 2 1 , 1 1 , 2 1 , 2 ) ( x u u u
c cN c = =
c u x 1 , 2 1 , 2 ˆ < ) 1 ( ) , ( 1 , 2 1 , 2 α β − ≥ x x gu ))) ( ( ( 1 , 2 1 1 , 2 x u x b
cN − ′ α .  This is a noteworthy 
difference between the present setting and SP’s model.  As explained in footnote 9 in SP, in a symmetric 
aquifer, complete rent dissipation never arises in non-cooperative equilibrium due to restricted access.  As long 
as the asymmetry across cells is small, movement of groundwater between cells is limited even when the 
velocity of lateral flow is (inter-seasonally) instantaneous.  As a result, because each user benefits from a more 
  17reaches 133% of her initial stock, while the total consumption of farmer 1 declines to just 
56% of his initial stock.  At this level of asymmetry, the strategic advantage of farmer 2 
plateaus because the lateral flow cannot exceed the quantity of water that remains in cell 1 in 
the end of period 1.  For  , farmer 1 randomizes between pumping 
 with probability   
, and   with probability   
and  .  Finally, for  , the considerations of intertemporal efficiency 
dominate farmer 2’s pumping decision, which, given her large stock, implies that farmer 1 is 
not able to save any water for period 2 due to outflow,   and  .   
) 46 . 0 , 14 . 0 ( ∈ s
3 / )) ( ˆ 2 4 ( ) ˆ ( 1 , 2 1 , 2 1 , 1 1 , 1 s u u u u
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Figure 4.  Equilibrium pumping under complete information 
                                                                                                                                                        
balanced usage of water across time, depletion in the first period cannot arise in either non-cooperative 
equilibrium or the socially efficient solution in a symmetric (or slightly asymmetric) aquifer. 
  18If the cells are hydrologically isolated, i.e.  0 = = L α α , both farmers split their stocks 
equally between periods 1 and 2,   and  . The (expected) 
equilibrium pumping rates for 
) 1 ( 5 . 0 1 , 1 s u
c − = ) 1 ( 5 . 0 1 , 2 s u
c + =
0 = α  and  5 . 0 = α  are depicted as solid lines in Figure 4. ■ 
 
  Next we investigate the effect of public information about the speed of lateral flows 
on the expected pumping rates and producer welfare in non-cooperative equilibrium.  
   
4. Complete versus incomplete information 
To an observer who knows only the probability distribution of α ~ over the aquifer, the 
expected water pumped in period 1 by farmer   is  , and expected profits attained 
by non-cooperative farmers with complete hydrologic information are 
i )] ~ ( [ 1 , α
c
i u E
)] ~ ( [ α π
c
i E ,  .  In 
the next section, we compare the ex ante equilibrium pumping rates in the two information 
regimes. 
2 , 1 = i
   
4.1. Pumping under complete and incomplete information 
In the case of a symmetric aquifer, SP showed that the average equilibrium pumping rates 
may either increase or decrease under better public information depending on the curvature of 
the ratio of the marginal benefits of water in periods 1 and 2 ,  )] 1 ( /[ ) 1 , ( ) ( u b u g u f u − ′ = β .
17  
This result continues to hold in the case of an asymmetric aquifer provided that the 
asymmetry is sufficiently small. 
   
Proposition 3. (Information and pumping in a slightly asymmetric aquifer)  Suppose that 
  .  Then there exists an   such that each non-cooperative 
farmer pumps, on average, more (less) groundwater in period 1 under complete information 
about the speed of lateral flows, i.e. 
0 ) ( ) ( < > ′ ′ u f ) 1 , 5 . 0 [ ∈ ∀u 0 0 > s
≥ )] ~ ( [ 1 , α
c
i u E ) (≤
n
i u 1 , , i=1,2, for all  .  ] , 0 [ 0 s s∈
   
To ascertain the effect of information on the pumping rates when the asymmetry is 
larger, we first establish the following. 
   
Lemma 5. For  0 > L α , (i)  , and (ii)  .  ) ( ) ( L
cD
H
cD s s α α < ) ( ] , max[ L
cD nHD nLD s s s α <
   
                                                 
17 See SP for a discussion of the properties of  , intuition, and examples.  f
  19Suppose that in equilibrium farmer 1 depletes his stock in  1 = t ,  , when it is 
(publicly) known that 
s u L
c − =1 ) ( 1 , 1 α
0 ~ > = L α α .  Then he also does so if either (i) it becomes (publicly) 
known that the actual speed of lateral flows is higher, or (ii) complete public information is 
no longer available, and both farmers only know the probability distribution of α ~.   
Using Lemma 5, and Propositions 1 and 2, we obtain 
   
Proposition 4. (Irrelevant information)  Suppose that the asymmetry is sufficiently large and 
the lateral flow speed is always sufficiently close to instantaneous, i.e.  .  Then 
in either information regime in period 1 farmer 1 always consumes his entire stock, i.e. 
, and farmer 2 treats her stock as fully private, i.e. 
   .   
) 1 ), ( [ L
cD s s α ∈
) ( )] ~ ( [ 1 , 1 1 , 1 L
c c u u E α α = s u u
n
H
c − = = = 1 ) ( 1 , 1 1 , 1 α
)] ~ ( [ 1 , 2 α
c u E ) ( 1 , 2 L
c u α = ) 1 ( ) ( 1 , 2 1 , 2 1 , 2 s u u u
nD n
H
c − = = = α
   
Whenever the lateral flow velocity is always sufficiently high ( , which implies 
that 
1 ) ( < L
cD s α
0 > L α ), and the asymmetry is sufficiently large ( ), the precise information 
about 
) ( L
cD s s α ≥
α ~ is irrelevant for non-cooperative farmers, and the equilibrium pumping rates (as well 
as profits) are the same under both complete and incomplete information.
18   
For the rest of the analysis, we assume that the prior probability distribution of α ~ is 
sufficiently dispersed.  The following preliminary result will play a key role in ascertaining 
the demand for public information by individual users in the next subsection. 
   
Lemma 6.  For any   there exists an  ) 1 , 0 [ ∈ s 0 0 > α  such that   for all 
n
L
c u u 1 , 2 1 , 2 ) ( ≤ α
] , 0 [ 0 α α ∈ L . 
   
In any aquifer, if  L α  is sufficiently small, in equilibrium farmer 2 always pumps less when it 
is publicly known that  L α α = ~  than under incomplete information.
19  This is because the lack 
of information about α ~ fosters farmer 2’s strategic advantage in “stealing” her neighbor’s 
water.  Lemma 6 is trivially true for  0 = s  (see SP).  In a symmetric aquifer, the equilibrium 
pumping rates (which are equal across farmers) in t=1 increase when it is publicly known that 
                                                 
18 Nonetheless, it can be shown that information about α ~ may have a strictly positive value for the social 
planner even when the equilibrium outcomes are exactly the same under complete and incomplete information.  




L α α α
  20the speed of lateral flow is higher, i.e.  , i=1,2.  However, as shown in 
Section 3.2, in an asymmetric aquifer farmer 1’s pumping rate in t=1 may be greater when it 
is known that 




i u u α α ≤
L α α = ~  than when it is known that  H α α = ~ .  This happens when farmer 1 is 
more concerned with preserving some of his stock for future use than avoiding the loss due to 
outflow.  For instance, in Examples 1 and 2,   for 
, and   for 
) 1 ( 5 . 0 ) ( 1 , 1 s u L
c − = α )] ( ~ [ 1 , 1 H
c u E α ≥
] 2 . 0 , 12 . 0 [ ∈ s ] ~ [ ) ( 1 , 1 1 , 1
n
L
c u E u ≥ α ] 42 . 0 , 3 . 0 [ ∈ s .  Using Lemma 6, Propositions 1 and 
2, we establish 
   
Corollary 1. Suppose that  .  There exists such a  ) 1 ), ( [ H
cD s s α ∈ ) , 0 ( 0 H α α ∈  such that in 
equilibrium farmer 2 (ex post) pumps less under complete information for any realization of 





c u u u E u 1 , 2 1 , 2 1 , 2 1 , 2 ) ( )] ~ ( [ ) ( ≤ ≤ ≤ α α α ] , 0 [ 0 α α ∈ L . 
   
Suppose that the asymmetry is sufficiently large and the range of the possible speeds 
of lateral flows is sufficiently wide, e.g.   and  ) 1 ), ( [ H
cD s s α ∈ 0 = L α  (note that, by Lemma 
5(i),   is non-increasing in  ) (α
cD s α ).  Then farmer 2 (ex post) pumps less in t=1 under 
complete information.  To intuitively see why, note that when it is known that groundwater 
does not flow across cells, both farmers treat their stocks as fully private.  If the speed of 
lateral flow is known to be high, by assumption, farmer 1 consumes his entire stock in t=1, 
but farmer 2 still treats her stock as fully private since there is no possibility of stealing any 
water from farmer 1, who has already exhausted his resource.  On the other hand, under 
incomplete information, farmer 1 always leaves some stock unused in t=1 to take advantage 
of the possible gains in intertemporal efficiency from a more even distribution of his stock 
across time.  This strategy involves his taking on the risk that the unused portion of his stock 
will flow into cell 2.  The possibility of “stealing” some of the resource from farmer 1 creates 
an incentive for farmer 2 to pump more than is called for by the (private) considerations of 
intertemporal efficiency alone.  As a result, farmer 2 pumps more under incomplete 
information.  The following example illustrates. 
   
Example 3. (Information and pumping)  Consider the same environment as in Example 1.  
The average (ex ante) pumping rates under complete (dotted lines) and incomplete 
  21information (solid lines) are shown in Figure 2.  The effects of better information on the 
equilibrium pumping rates are summarized in Table 1.  As shown in SP, if  ,  0 = s 0 = L α , 
5 . 0 = H α ,  , and  5 . 0 = q u x u g = ) , ( , better public information has a positive effect on the 
average pumping rate.  This result continues to hold if the asymmetry is sufficiently small, 
, or if it falls in some intermediate range,  ] 12 . 0 , 0 [ ∈ s ] 4 . 0 , 38 . 0 [ ∈ s .  However, the effect of 
better public information on the average pumping rate is reversed if the asymmetry is larger, 
for    .  For  ] 38 . 0 , 12 . 0 [ ∈ s ) 1 , 4 . 0 [ ∪ ] 48 . 0 , 26 . 0 [ ] 23 . 0 , 01 . 0 [ ∪ ∈ s , public information has the 
opposite effects on the pumping rates of farmers 1 and 2.  Farmer 1 (2) pumps more under 
better information for   (respectively, ] 01 . 0 , 0 [ ∈ s ] 48 . 0 , 26 . 0 [ ∪ ] 23 . 0 , 0 [ ∈ s ).  ■ 
   
Table 1.  The effect of better public information on equilibrium pumping 
Asymmetry  Farmer 1 pumping  Farmer 2 pumping  Average pumping 
] 01 . 0 , 0 [ ∈ s   + + +
] 12 . 0 , 01 . 0 [ ∈ s   − + + 
] 23 . 0 , 12 . 0 [ ∈ s   − + − 
] 26 . 0 , 23 . 0 [ ∈ s   −  −  − 
] 38 . 0 , 26 . 0 [ ∈ s   +  −  − 
] 4 . 0 , 38 . 0 [ ∈ s   +  − + 
] 48 . 0 , 4 . 0 [ ∈ s   +  −  − 
) 1 , 48 . 0 [ ∈ s   −  −  − 
   
Next we analyze the effect of better public information about the speed of lateral 
flows on the expected producer profits. 
   
4.2. The effect of public information on profits 
Keeping the neighbor’s pumping rate unchanged, each farmer benefits from more information 
as it allows him or her to better predict the lateral flow and future stocks, and choose a more 
appropriate pumping rate.  However, typically, both farmers adjust their pumping rates upon 
the public announcement.  As a result, the expected profits may increase or decrease, as better 
information about the environment may, on average, exacerbate or alleviate the “mixed” 
tragedy of the commons effect. 
In the case of a symmetric aquifer, SP identified the necessary and sufficient condition 
on the production technology under which welfare is reduced or enhanced by better 
information.  The same condition (only slightly stronger) also determines the value of public 
information for non-cooperative farmers when the extent of asymmetry is sufficiently small.  
  22Let  ) (u π ) 1 ( ) 1 , ( u b u g − + = β  denote the discounted profits attained by allocating water 
equally across farmers in a symmetric aquifer (with  0 = s ). 
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20  Then there exists an   such that each non-
cooperative farmer attains, on average, lower (higher) expected welfare under complete 
information about the speed of lateral flows, i.e., 
0 0 > s
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SP provide examples and explain how the curvature conditions in Proposition 3 and 5 
can be related to more basic properties of  .  We are now ready to state our main results 
that ascertain the effect of information on (joint and individual) welfare when the asymmetry 
is larger.  First, we show that, provided that (i) the extent of asymmetry is sufficiently large, 
and (ii) the prior probability distribution on the hydrologic properties is sufficiently diffuse, 
non-cooperative farmers attain a higher expected aggregate welfare under better information 
about the lateral flow velocity.  
) , ( x u g
 
Proposition 6.  (Information and joint welfare in a sufficiently asymmetric aquifer)  There 
exist   and  ) 1 ), ( [ 0 H
cD s s α ∈ ) , 0 ( 0 H α α ∈  such that non-cooperative farmers attain, on 
average, higher (possibly maximum) expected joint welfare under complete information 
about the speed of lateral flows, i.e.  ∑ ∑ = = ≥





i E π α π  for  ) 1 , [ 0 s s∈ ,  ] , 0 [ 0 α α ∈ L . 
   
The intuition is as follows.  Under conditions (i) and (ii), the joint welfare in the non-
cooperative equilibrium equals (or is close to) the maximum joint welfare attainable under 
complete information.  In other words, in an asymmetric aquifer, distortions due to the 
exploitation of groundwater as a common property resource may be eliminated by better 
public information.  If  L α α = ~  is common knowledge, and  L α  is close to 0, the stocks of each 
farmer are (approximately) fully private, and hence, are, by default, efficiently allocated from 
the societal point of view.  If  H α α = ~  is common knowledge, and the asymmetry is 
                                                 
20   denotes the inverse of  . 
1() f
− ⋅ f
  23sufficiently large, farmer 1 consumes his entire stock in  1 = t  even under the socially efficient 
allocation.  This is because any water that he saves in  1 = t  will be lost due to outflow, but his 
marginal benefit of water in   exceeds his neighbor’s discounted marginal benefit of 
water in  .  Thus, the privately optimal pumping rates of non-cooperative, informed users 
also maximize the joint welfare.
1 = t
2 = t
21  But the maximum attainable aggregate welfare cannot 
increase due to either the lack of information about the environment or non-cooperative 
behavior.  This result has an important policy implication: better hydrologic information may 
allow non-cooperative users to achieve maximum social welfare even in the absence of 
groundwater use regulations.  
  Our next result states that under similar conditions (possibly, under weaker conditions 
since   in Proposition 6) farmer 1 (respectively, 2) attains higher (respectively, 
lower) expected profits under better public information. 
0 ) ( s s H
cD ≤ α
   
Proposition 7. (Information and individual welfare in a sufficiently asymmetric aquifer) 
Suppose that  . There exists an  ) 1 ), ( [ H
cD s s α ∈ ) , 0 ( 0 H α α ∈  such that farmer 1 (2) achieves 
higher (lower) expected profits under complete information about the speed of lateral flows 
for any  ] , 0 [ 0 α α ∈ L , i.e. 
n c E 1 1 )] ~ ( [ π α π ≥  and 
n c E 2 2 )] ~ ( [ π α π ≤ . 
   
To see intuitively why this is true, let  0 = L α  (the speed of lateral flow is sometimes 
negligible).  Also, we suppose that   (the aquifer is sufficiently asymmetric).  
Consider farmer 1’s equilibrium pumping for different announcements about 
) 1 ), ( [ H
cD s s α ∈
α ~.  If  0 ~ = α  
(respectively, H α α = ~ ), farmer 1 consumes a portion of his stock (respectively, his entire 
stock) in period 1.  In either outcome farmer 1 loses none of his water due to outflow.  And 
so, farmer 1’s ability to save some of his stock for future use while avoiding outflows is 
undermined by the lack of public information, and his expected profits decrease.  Moreover, 
when the value of α ~ is unknown, farmer 2 anticipates the possibility of an inflow, and raises 
her pumping rate in t=1 since her water supply becomes, on average, less scarce in t=2 (see 
                                                 
21 Note that cell 1 will not be empty in   for  2 = t H α α = ~ , only if farmer 2 consumes a small share of his 
(relatively large) stock in t = 1 in order to reduce the inter-period outflow from cell 1.  But such an allocation of 
water brings about too onerous a loss in the intertemproal efficiency of allocation of farmer 2’s stock compared 
with the gain in the intertemporal efficiency of allocation of farmer 1’s stock. 
  24Corollary 1).  These effects are also at work for  0 > L α , provided that farmer 2’s (ex post) 
pumping rates decrease under better information.  Therefore, farmer 1 is “hit twice” by the 
lack of information: (a) keeping his neighbor’s pumping unchanged, his expected profits 
decrease because he cannot match a low (high) pumping rate with the low (high) lateral flow 
speed; and (b) farmer 1’s profits is further reduced by a (weakly) greater outflow due to a 
greater drawdown in cell 2.  
The lack of public information has the opposite (i.e. a positive) effect on the expected 
profits of farmer 2.  When the value of α ~ is unknown, farmer 2 sometimes appropriates a 
portion of her neighbor’s stock, which she cannot do under complete information (if  0 = L α ).  
Furthermore, unlike farmer 1 whose pumping rate is very sensitive to the news about α ~, 
farmer 2’s pumping rate is invariant to the content of a public announcement since the best 
farmer 2 can do is treat her stock as fully private when farmer 1 knows whether  0 ~ = α  or 
H α α = ~ .  And so, better public information does not enhance farmer 2’s ability to improve 
her own intertemporal efficiency given her neighbor’s pumping flexibility in  , while it 
inhibits her ability to “steal” water from cell 1.  When 
1 = t
L α  is strictly positive but sufficiently 
close to 0, the negative effect of public information on farmer 2’s profits from a smaller 
expected inflow dominates the positive effect due to an improved ability to allocate her stock 
more efficiently across time.  Example 4 illustrates. 
   
Example 4.  (Information and welfare)  The joint and individual producer profits under 
incomplete and complete information are shown, respectively, as “thick” and “thin” lines in 
Figure 5.  The effect of incomplete information on profits is summarized in Table 2.  As 
shown in SP, if   and  0 = s u x u g = ) , ( , the average welfare decreases under better public 
information about the lateral flow speed.  This result continues to hold if the asymmetry is not 
too great,   (see Proposition 5).  But, for  ] 38 . 0 , 0 [ ∈ s ) 1 , 38 . 0 [ ∈ s , the joint welfare is higher 
under complete information (see Proposition 6).  When  5 . 0 ~ = α , better public information 
assuages both the distributional and temporal inefficiencies:  Farmer 1 is better able to avoid 
water loss, and farmer 2 is more concerned with achieving an intertemporally efficient 
allocation of her initial stock rather than with “stealing” her neighbor’s water.  Of course, 
both farmers achieve maximum efficiency when it is common knowledge that  0 ~ = α .  Next 
we examine the effect of information on individual producer profits. 
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                               Table 2. The effect of better public  
                                information on producer profits 
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Figure 5. Profits under incomplete and complete information 
   
For  , both farmers are worse off.  As explained in SP, complete 
information, on average, aggravates the “tragedy of the commons effect” and the joint 
welfare falls because the average pumping rate is higher (see Example 3).  However, for 
, the effect of information differs across farmers: farmer 2 (1) is better off 
(worse off).  Better information enables farmer 2 to better exercise her strategic advantage at 
the expense of farmer 1 who is in the “accommodating mode” and, on average, loses more of 
his stock due to the outflows.  Better information exacerbates the distributional distortion 
stemming from the commonality of groundwater whereas farmer 1’s (2’s) total consumption, 
on average, decreases (increases).  For 
] 03 . 0 . 0 [ ∈ s
] 26 . 0 , 03 . 0 [ ∈ s
] 32 . 0 , 26 . 0 [ ∈ s , both farmers are made worse off by 
information: farmer 1 is more often in the “cut water loss mode” in which he minimizes the 
outflow rather than strives to achieve a greater (expected) intertemporal efficiency.  Here 
information exacerbates the temporal inefficiency associated with the unregulated water use 
whereas both farmers consume, on average, more water in period 1.   
For   and  , farmer 2’s strategic advantage is further eroded 
by better public information.  Only farmer 1 is better off since he frequently (in fact, always 
for  ) consumes his entire stock in 
] 38 . 0 , 32 . 0 [ ∈ s ) 1 , 38 . 0 [ ∈ s
) 1 , 46 . 0 [ ∈ s 1 = t  when it is known that the inter-period 
  26lateral flow is instantaneous,  5 . 0 ~ = α , while he consumes only a portion of his stock under 
uncertainty about α ~ (see Proposition 7).  ■ 
 
5. Conclusions and Implications 
This paper analyzes a simple two-period model of groundwater exploitation in a two-cell 
aquifer under a novel assumption that the bottom elevation differs across cells.  This 
asymmetry creates a strategic advantage (disadvantage) for the user in the deep (shallow) cell 
in “stealing” the groundwater lying beneath the neighboring farm at the end of the irrigation 
season.  Asymmetry in bottom elevation, combined with the lack of “full” ownership rights to 
groundwater, aggravates the intrinsic inequality in income distribution caused by the 
difference in the initial water endowments.  The user with a larger initial stock actually 
benefits from the exploitation of groundwater as a common property resource when the 
asymmetry is not too small or too great. 
Because in reality producers do not have perfect knowledge of the local hydrologic 
properties, it is of interest to identify conditions under which incomplete information has an 
unambiguous effect on the equilibrium pumping rates and producer welfare in an asymmetric 
aquifer.  Consistent with SP’s conclusions, as long as asymmetry in bottom elevation is 
sufficiently small, production technology is the main determinant of the value of public 
information for non-cooperative users in the presence of distortions caused by the 
commonality of the resource.   
However, this is not the case when the asymmetry in initial stocks is sufficiently large.  
Then, if the externality is always significant, information about its precise value is irrelevant 
for equilibrium outcomes.  But, whenever the prior beliefs are sufficiently dispersed, better 
informed users achieve a higher joint welfare.  Moreover, the welfare losses from unregulated 
resource use may stem solely from the lack of information.  That is, in an asymmetric aquifer, 
non-cooperative equilibrium and socially efficient allocations may coincide under complete 
information but differ under uncertainty about the lateral flow velocity.  In such cases, 
educating and informing users about the true resource dynamics is all that is needed to 
achieve maximum social welfare.  Yet, even when the overall welfare increases, some users 
may be worse off under better public information.
22 
                                                 
22 As shown in SP, in the symmetric aquifer users always agree on the welfare ranking of equilibrium outcomes 
for different levels of precision of public information. 
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  28Appendix 
Proof of Lemma 1:  To determine the best response correspondence by farmer 1, it is 
convenient to solve (5) for   as a two-step optimization problem  1 = i
(A1)  .  )] ( ), ( ), ( max[ ) ( 1 , 2 1 1 , 2 1 1 , 2 1 1 , 2 1 u u u u
nD nL nH n π π π π =
Note that farmer 1 never lets his well go dry in t=2 when  , since   1 , 1 1 , 2 x u ≤
(A2)   for  ,  ) ( ) ( ) ( 1 , 2 1 1 , 2 1 1 , 2 1 u u u
nH nL nD π π π < < 1 , 1 1 , 2 x u ≤
where the strict inequalities follow because   implies that  1 , 1 1 , 2 x u ≤ ) , , ( 1 , 2 1 , 1 2 , 1 u x x L α 0 ≥  and 
, so that   and   are feasible but 
are not profit-maximizing.  On the other hand, by (6)-(8), and because   and 
, we have 
0 ) ), ( , ( 1 , 2 1 , 2 1 , 1 2 , 1 > u u u x
L
H α ) ( ) ( 1 , 2 1 , 1 1 , 2 1 , 1 u u u u
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For  ) / , ( 1 , 1 1 , 1 1 , 2 L x x u α ∈ , by the envelope theorem, we have 
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where the first inequality follows because  L L H H α α α α / ) 1 ( 1 − < − , and the second inequality 
follows from the FOCs in (7) because   and   for  ) ( ) ( 1 , 2 1 , 1 1 , 2 1 , 1 u u u u
nL nH < 1 , 1 1 , 2 1 , 1 ) ( x u u
nH <
) / , ( 1 , 1 1 , 1 1 , 2 L x x u α ∈ .  Therefore, by (A2)-(A4), and, because the profit functions are 
continuous in  , (note that   is independent of  ) there exist threshold values  , 
, and   such that   for all   (resp.,  ), 
 for all  , and   for all  . 
1 , 2 u ) ( 1 , 1 x b 1 , 2 u
nHL u 1 , 2 ˆ
nLD u 1 , 2 ˆ
nHD u 1 , 2 ˆ ) ( ) ( ) ( 1 1 u u
nL nH π π < ≥
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nHL x u u α ∈
) ( ) ( ) ( 1 1 u u
nD nL π π < ≥
nLD u u 1 , 2 ˆ ) (> ≤ ) ( ) ( ) ( 1 1 u u
nD nH π π < ≥
nHD u u 1 , 2 ˆ ) (> ≤
There are two cases to consider: (a)  , and (b)  . 
nHL u 1 , 2 ˆ
nLD nHD u u 1 , 2 1 , 2 ˆ ˆ ≤ ≤
nHL nHD nLD u u u 1 , 2 1 , 2 1 , 2 ˆ ˆ ˆ < <
In case (a), by (A1), the best response for farmer 1 is given by 
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In case (b), by (A1), the best response for farmer 1 is given by 
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Note that (A5) and (A6) are upper hemicontinuous correspondences since in case (a) 
 and  , where 
,  ,  , 
, and   is single-valued for  .  Case (b) is 
analogous (just set   in case (a)). ■ 
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Proof of Lemma 2:  Consider (5) for  2 = i  as a two-step optimization problem  
(A7)    ,  )] ( ), ( ), ( max[ ) ( 1 , 1 2 1 , 1 2 1 , 1 2 1 , 1 2 u u u u
nD nL nH n π π π π =
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In each problem (A8)-(A10), the objective function is differentiable (and concave) on 
the constraint set  : { 1 , 2 u ]} ), , ( min[ 1 , 2 1 , 1 1 , 2 x u d u H α ≤  (respectively,  ∈ 1 , 2 1 , 2 : { u u ), , ( [ 1 , 1 H u d α  
]} ), , ( min[ 1 , 2 1 , 1 x u d L α , and  ∈ 1 , 2 1 , 2 : { u u ]} ), , ( [ 1 , 2 1 , 1 x u d L α ), and the maximizer for each 
problem   (respectively,  , and  ) is a continuous function, which is 
given by equations (10) (respectively, (11) and (12)) in the text.  
) ( 1 , 1 1 , 2 u u
nH ) ( 1 , 1 1 , 2 u u
nL ) ( 1 , 1 1 , 2 u u
nD
If  , the constraint sets in (A9) and (A10) are empty, and 
.  If   and 
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)))] , ( , , ~ ( ( 1 , 1 1 , 1 2 , 2 H u d u x b α α ′ , none of the constraints in (A8) bind, and therefore,   is 
the unique global maximizer (note that the objective function in (5) is strictly concave).  Now 
suppose that 
) ( 1 , 1 1 , 2 u u
nH
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nL π ,  where the inequality 
follows because   satisfies the constraints in (A9), and re-optimization cannot 
decrease profits.  There are two cases to consider.  If 
) , ( 1 , 1 1 , 2 H u d u α =
) , ( ) , ( 1 1 , 2 1 L H u d x u d α α < < , the 
constraint set in (A10) is empty, and   must be the global maximizer.  If    ) ( 1 , 1 1 , 2 u u
nL
1 , 2 x
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where the inequality follows because   satisfies the constraints in (A9), and 
re-optimization cannot decrease profits.  And so, under any of these conditions,    is 
) , ( 1 , 1 1 , 2 L u d u α =
) ( 1 , 1 1 , 2 u u
nL
  30the (unique) global maximizer.  Finally, if  ) , ( 1 , 1 1 , 2 L u d x α ≥  and  ) ), , ( ( 1 , 2 1 , 1 x u d g L u α  
) 1 ( L qα β − ≥ ))) , ( , , ( ( 1 , 1 1 , 1 1 , 2 L L u d u x b α α ′ , we have   
, where the inequality follows because   
satisfies the constraints in (A10), and re-optimization cannot decrease profits.  The proof that 
the best response for farmer 2 is given by (13), is completed by noting that   is a 
continuous single-valued function since   =  if 
 and 
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Proof of Lemma 3: The existence of equilibrium in mixed strategies follows by Theorem 3 
in Dasgupta and Maskin (1986) (or by Lemmas 1, 2, and Kakutani fixed point theorem).  
Because   (and restricted access), farmers never simultaneously deplete their 
stocks in period 1 in equilibrium.  By Lemma 2, farmer 2 cannot randomize.  To show that 
, suppose to the contrary that  .  Then it must be that 
 for any 
(0, ) u g ⋅= ∞
1 ) ~ Pr( 1 , 2 1 , 1 = <
n n u u 0 ) ~ Pr( 1 , 2 1 , 1 > ≥
n n u u
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Hence, by Lemmas 1 and 2, we have 
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From (A11) and (A12), it follows that 
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which yields a contradiction because   is concave and  .  ■  g 0 ≥ ux g
 
Proof of Proposition 1: First, we state the necessary and sufficient conditions for different 
types of the best responses to be played in equilibrium, and prove the (a.e.) uniqueness of 
equilibrium.  Then we show the existence of the threshold levels of asymmetry that partition 
 into sub-intervals where the type of equilibrium is the same.  ) 1 , 0 [ ∈ s
The following lemma will be used to characterize equilibrium under incomplete 
information. 
 
Lemma 4.  (Asymmetry and threshold pumping rates) Suppose that  0 ) , ( ) , ( ≤ + x u g x u g ux uu  
for all  .  Then  , and there exists such a  1 ≤ ≤ x u 1 / ˆ 1 , 2 − < ds u d
nLD ) , 0 ( 0 H α α ∈  such that for any 
] , 0 [ 0 α α ∈ L ,  .  1 / ˆ 1 , 2 − < ds u d
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nLD nD nL u π π .  The last equality follows by the 
FOC in (7) for  L K = .  The inequality follows because   and 
.  
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Using the envelope theorem to differentiate (8) for  L M H K = = ,  yields   
, where   
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The last equality follows by the FOCs in (7).  The inequality follows because   
 and 
) ( 1 , 2 1 , 1 u u
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nL < 0 ) , ( ) , ( ≤ + x u g x u g ux uu . ■ 
 
Step 1. Suppose that  .  Then farmer 1 may find it optimal to risk saving some of 
his stock for later use even though the fast outflow will leave his well dry.  For example, this 
must be the case whenever 
nLD nHL u u 1 , 2 1 , 2 ˆ ˆ <
L α  is sufficiently small since, by (8),  . There are 
five cases that need to be considered as possible equilibrium outcomes.   
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Case 1. Suppose that in equilibrium  .  Then  , and by 
Lemmas 1 and 2, the necessary and sufficient conditions for  , 
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Note that (A13) is implied by 
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First, note that (A14) implies that  .  To see why, suppose that 
 and (A14) holds.  Then, by (A14b), we have 
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where the inequality follows because  (the best responses are piece-wise 
differentiable).  Hence, we obtained a contradiction.  Second, since  , it must 
be that either (A13a) or (A13b) holds because   
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Also, it must be that  .  If  , then cell 1 must be empty in   
because, by Lemma 3, in equilibrium  , which contradicts the assumption that 
.   Furthermore, this equilibrium is locally unique in the sense that there 
is no other equilibrium  , 
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Case 2.  Suppose that in equilibrium farmer 1 randomizes:   and 
, and farmer 2 pumps  .  By Lemmas 1 and 2, the necessary 
and sufficient conditions are 
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Because  , it must be that farmer 1 always has a positive stock in t=2 if he pumps   
, i.e.  .  Also, because , it must be that 
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  33positive and decreasing.  Therefore, (A15) guarantees that  ) 1 , 0 ( / ∈ μ λ .  Note that, by (A17), 
this equilibrium is locally unique (i.e.,   is unique) if  . 
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Case 3. Suppose that cell 1 is (resp., not) empty in t=1 when  H α α =  (resp.,  L α α = ).  Then 
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Note that (A18) and (A19) are implied by  
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To see why, note that since  , (A20b) and (A20c) imply that   
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Furthermore, this equilibrium is locally unique by the same argument that is used to show 
local uniqueness in Case 1. 
Case 4. Suppose that in equilibrium farmer 1 randomizes:   and 
, and farmer 2 pumps  .  By Lemmas 1 and 2, the necessary and 
sufficient conditions are 
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By using the same arguments as in Case 2, it follows that (A21) guarantees that  .  
Furthermore, this equilibrium is also locally unique (i.e.,   is unique). 
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Case 5. Suppose that in equilibrium  ,  .  Then, by Lemmas 1 and 2, 
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Clearly, this equilibrium is locally unique.   
  Because the necessary and sufficient conditions in Cases 1-5 are mutually exclusive, 
equilibrium is (a.e.) globally unique.  The analysis in the case with   is similar, 
except that in equilibrium cell 1 is either always empty or never empty in period 2, i.e. farmer 
1 avoids any gamble whose worst outcome is zero stock in period 2.
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The proof is completed by setting  ] [ min 5 ,..., 1 0 i i α α = = . ■ 
 
Proof of Proposition 3: By Propositions 1 and 2, the equilibrium pumping rates under 
incomplete (respectively, complete) information are continuous in   for   
(respectively, , 
s ] , 0 [
nH s s∈
)] ( , 0 [ α
cN s s∈ H L α α α , = ).  Hence, by continuity, there exists a   such 
that   for all 
0 0 > s




i ≤ ≥ α ] , 0 [ 0 s s∈  depending on whether  0 ) (< > ′ ′ f  because, by 
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Proof of Corollary 1: Because, by assumption,  , applying Proposition 2, we 
have  .  By Lemma 6, there exists an 
) ( H
cD s s α ≥
) ( ) 1 ( ) ( 1 , 2 1 , 2 1 , 2 L
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H
c u s u u α α ≤ − = 0 0 > α  such that 
 for all 
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Proof of Proposition 5: The proof is analogous to the proof of Proposition 3. ■ 
 
Proof of Proposition 6:  Consider the social planner’s problem under complete information 
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It is convenient to solve (A26) as a two-step optimization program, as follows 
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β α  subject to (1), (2), 
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α β  denote the 
maximum attainable welfare under incomplete information.  Note that for  ] 5 . 0 , 0 ( ∈ α , we 
have 
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Hence, by continuity, for any  ] 5 . 0 , 0 ( ∈ H α , there exists an  ) 1 , 0 ( ) ( 0 ∈ H s α  such that 
, and the socially efficient allocation is given by   
and   for all 
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both farmers know that 
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H α α = ~ .  Hence, it must be that  .  In addition, the 
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The first inequality follows because non-cooperative farmers cannot attain a higher joint 
welfare than the social planner (in fact, from the optimality conditions it follows that they 
attain a strictly lower joint welfare under incomplete information).  The second inequality 
follows because the lack of information cannot possibly increase the maximum attainable 
joint welfare, i.e.  )] , ~ ( [ ) ( s W E s W
sc sn α <  (because the social planner can always discard more 
precise information about α ~).  The inequality is strict because the socially efficient allocation 
is responsive to the realization of α ~ since  H L α α < = 0 .  By continuity, there exists  0 α  
) , 0 ( H α ∈  such that  ∑ ∑ = = ≤
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Proof of Proposition 7: Because  , by Corollary 1, there exists an  ) ( H
cD s s α ≥ 1 α  such that  
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Hence, by (5), for any  ] , 0 [ 1 α α ∈ L , we have 
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The first inequality follows by (A27).  The second inequality follows because re-optimization 
by farmer 1 conditional on the new information cannot decrease profits, where we assume 
that he randomizes in an equilibrium manner if   (recall that farmer 1 is 
indifferent between pumping   and 
c
L
c u u 1 , 2 1 , 2 ˆ ) ( = α
) ( 1 , 1 L
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To show that farmer 2 achieves a lower expected profit under better public 
information, we first establish the validity of the following claims.   
Claim 1. There exists an  0 2 > α  such that  ] , 0 [ 2 α α ∈ ∀ L  




L u u s α α α H L K , = . 
Note that, by (1), (A28) trivially holds for  0 = L α .  Hence, by continuity, one can always 
pick  2 α  sufficiently close to 0 such that (A28) continues to hold, because, by Proposition 2, 
 implies that  .   ) ( H
cD s s α ≥ ) ( ) 0 ( 1 , 2 1 , 2 H
c c u u α α = =
Claim 2.  There exists an  0 3 > α  such that  ] , 0 [ 3 α α ∈ ∀ L  
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where the inequality follows because the function   is 
supermodular for   since 
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change the sign of the inequality, which proves (A29).   
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where  )] 1 ( , 0 [ q q − ∈ ε .   
Turning to the effect of information on the farmer 2’s expected profits, by (5), there 
exists an  0 0 > α  such that for any  ] , 0 [ 0 α α ∈ L , we have 
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  39The first inequality follows because   is the (unique) maximizer of the farmer 2’s expected 
profits under incomplete information.  In particular, farmer 2’s expected profits cannot 
increase if she randomizes between the pumping rates that are her equilibrium choices under 
complete information (note that the pumping rates are assumed to be independent from 
n u 1 , 2
α ~).  
The second inequality follows because, by (A30), her expected profits decrease further if her 
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third inequality in (A31) holds strictly for  0 = L α  because then we have 
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since, by assumption,   so that  .  Hence, by 
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0 4 > α  such that the third inequality in (A31) is satisfied for any 
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